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EXPANDING PROTECTION
FOR ATTORNEY SOLICITATION-
IN RE TEICHNER
Recent controversies involving attorney solicitation of clients compel an
examination of commercial speech1 and its constitutional protections. The
application of first amendment 2 protection to communication between an
attorney and a potential client was considered recently by the United States
Supreme Court in the companion cases of In re Primus3 and Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association. 4 In these cases, the Court held that solicitation
1. Commercial speech describes speech arising from purely commercial transactions.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978). It is distinguished from noncommer-
cial speech by its content. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). Although the United States Supreme Court has held that com-
mercial speech is protected by the first amendment, it does not enjoy the same preferred
position as noncommercial speech. The two types of speech have been held to be not "wholly
undifferentiable," thus the "common sense differences" between speech proposing a commer-
cial transaction and other varieties of speech have not been discarded. Id. at 771 n.24. Advertis-
ing has been characterized as a "classic example" of commercial speech. Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). Commercial speech, how-
ever, is not confined to advertising. Id. at 384. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). Solicitation is a form of commercial speech, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. at 454, but it has been distinguished from advertising. See note 32 infra.
2. The first amendment guarantees freedom of speech and association. U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
3. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, allegations had been made that pregnant women had
been sterilized or had been threatened with sterilization by their doctor as a condition of the
continued receipt of medical assistance under the "Medicaid" program. The American Civil
Liberties Union was contacted by a concerned individual in the community who wanted a rep-
resentative to address some of these women. At the ACLU's request, attorney Primus arranged
a meeting, advised the women of their legal rights, and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit.
Id. at 416. Subsequently, the ACLU decided to provide free legal representation for the
sterilized women. When Primus learned that one of the women wanted to bring suit, she
relayed the ACLU's offer of free representation through a letter. This letter became the
basis of the complaint filed against her. Id at 417. The Court held that Primus' solicitation for
ideological and associational reasons was protected. Id. at 431. See text accompanying notes
62-64 infra.
4. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Ohralik, an attorney, learned of an automobile accident involving a
casual acquaintance. Subsequently, Ohralik visited the injured party and offered to represent
her. The victim did not sign a contract immediately because she wanted to discuss the matter
with her parents. Nevertheless, Ohralik took pictures of the victim in traction and later took
pictures of the accident scene. Id. at 450. Ohralik also taped a subsequent conversation with the
victim's parents on a concealed tape recorder. Eventually a contingent-fee contract was signed.
Id.
Ohralik obtained the name of the other injured party and went to her home uninvited. After
Ohralik provided a "tip" on the possible amount of recovery, the victim, admitting she was
confused, said he could represent her. Id. at 451. When the victim's mother attempted to
repudiate the agreement, Ohralik refused to withdraw, thereby causing a delay in the settle-
ment with the insurance company. Both girls discharged him and subsequently filed a complaint.
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for ideological and associational reasons is protected communication, 5while
solicitation solely for pecuniary purposes is unprotected communication. 6
In re Teichner 7 represents the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of
Primus and Ohralik. Through an analysis of these decisions, the Teichner
court attempted to distinguish between permissible and impermissible solici-
tation. In doing so, the court established a middle ground of protection for
an attorney who solicits for both pecuniary and ideological reasons. 8
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Teichner court's reasoning and
to discuss the shortcomings of certain aspects of its decision. Further,
suggestions will be made for judicial action to help clarify the status of the
law in this area.
TEICHNER'S FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Teichner, a Chicago attorney, solicited clients in two similar situations in
which people were injured by railroad car explosions. 9 The first incident
arose in Laurel, Mississippi, where a local minister had established a relief
program and had sought legal counsel for persons injured in such an explosion.
Because the minister thought local counsel to be unsatisfactory, he contacted
attorney Teichner. 10 Teichner thereafter attended an informational meet-
ing arranged by the minister in his church, but he did not address the
group. 11 Subsequently, however, Teichner did actively solicit employment.
In one incident, Teichner asked an individual whose parents had been in-
jured for permission to visit them in the hospital. 12 In a second incident,
he sought and obtained a contingent-fee contract from another injured
party. 13
Id. at 452. The Court held that Ohralik's solicitation was solely for pecuniary purposes and was
unprotected. Id. at 449. See text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
5. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978). For a definition of "ideological" and "associa-
tional" see note 34 infra.
6. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
7. 75 I11. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979).
8. In effect, Primus and Ohralik represent opposite ends of the spectrum. Ohralik involved
purely commercial speech, which was held to be unprotected. Primus involved speech which
was purely ideological and nonpecuniary and therefore protected. Teichner, which involved
both a financial interest and associated values, recognized a middle ground of protection. See
text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
9. The facts of the case are set out at 75 I11. 2d at 95-99, 106-14, 387 N.E.2d at 267-68,
272-76.
10. The minister, Reverend Johnson, also sought legal assistance from attorneys throughout
the state of Mississippi. Id. at 95, 387 N.E.2d at 267.
11. At that meeting, several other attorneys advised those attending of their legal rights in
general terms. Id. at 96, 387 N.E.2d at 267.
12. Although Teichner's contact was with the son, the court viewed it as solicitation of the
parents. The communication with the son was found to be indistinguishable from communica-
tion directly with the parents because it was expected that he would have an input into the
parents' decision. Id. at 99, 387 N.E.2d at 269.
13. After obtaining the contract, Teichner gave the client a sum of money as an advance on
her claim. Id. at 107, 387 N.E.2d at 272. Offering and advancing funds to a client is neither
1190 [Vol. 28:1189
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The second explosion occurred in Decatur, Illinois. Teichner again so-
licited employment, this time requesting assistance in obtaining the names of
individuals injured in the explosion. 14 In addition to paying people to so-
licit on his behalf,15 Teichner also approached individuals 1 6 faced with dis-
tressing emotional experiences, including a family whose home had been
damaged by the explosion 17 and another family confronted with the impend-
ing death of a family member. 18 Moreover, Teichner involved himself in a
potential conflict of interest situation. 19
On the basis of these facts, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission 20 filed a complaint 21 to institute disciplinary
uncommon nor against public policy. See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 589, 173
N.E. 827, 831 (1930). However, money cannot be given as a means of soliciting a case nor can
living costs habitually be advanced to potential clients. See Note, Solicitation of Clients and
Advertising by Attorneys, 9 DRAKE L. REV. 102, 107-08 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Sol-
icitation]. See, e.g., In re Moore, 8 I11. 2d 373, 381, 134 N.E.2d 324, 328 (1956). Further,
advanced funds are subject to reimbursement and ultimately must be repaid by the client. See
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 11. at 590, 173 N.E. at 831, ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS No. 42.
14. 75 Ill. 2d at 107, 387 N.E.2d at 273.
15. An attorney cannot provide compensation for the securing of employment he would not
have had otherwise. See Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77, 97, 186 S.W. 919, 926 (1916);
Solicitation, supra note 13, at 104.
16. If an attorney is given the impression that an individual wants to see him due to com-
munications received from the family or friends of the individual, the attorney has a right to
make the contact. However, it has been suggested that overeagerness generally brings the legal
profession into disrepute. See, e.g., Mason v. Papadopulos, 12 II1. App. 2d 140, 149, 138
N.E.2d 821, 826 (1956).
17. 75 I11. 2d at 108, 387 N.E.2d at 273.
18. Id. at 110, 387 N.E.2d at 274.
19. Teichner sought to represent the son of a decedent and the same decedent's former
wife, while also representing other family members. 75 Ill. 2d at 111-13, 387 N.E.2d at 274-75.
This conflict was compounded by an arrearage in support payments to the former wife for the
son's benefit which could interfere with the other claims against the railroad. Teichner did not
discuss the potential conflict of interest with the parties involved. Id. at 112, 387 N.E.2d at 275.
An attorney should not represent parties with adverse interests. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(A), (B). Thus, any situation involving a present or potential conflict
of interest should be avoided. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 105 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
DRINKER].
20. The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission supervises disciplinary proceed-
ings against attorneys. ILL. SUP. CT. PRtc. R. 751. Investigations are made by the Inquiry
Board and hearings on complaints are conducted by the Hearing Board. The Hearing Board's
report is reviewed by the Review Board in all cases where action by the court has been recom-
mended. Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court reviews the proceeding if exceptions to the Re-
view Board report are made. ILL. SuP. CT. PRAC. R. 753.
21. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed the
complaint against Teichner. The original complaint included only the Decatur incidents. Sub-
sequently, an amended complaint was filed which included Teichner's conduct in Laurel. While
Counts I-XII of the amended complaint applied to Teichner's activities in Decatur, Illinois, only
Count XIV applied to the Laurel, Mississippi, incidents. 75 Ill. 2d at 94, 387 N.E.2d at 266. It
is interesting to note that while only one count applied to Laurel, those incidents provided the
basis for the court's analysis.
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proceedings. 22 The basis for the complaint was that Teichner's solicitation
of clients was improper 23 and consequently was prohibited by the Illinois
Code of Professional Responsibility. 24 The Hearing Board determined that
22. The authority of the disciplinary proceeding derives from local statutes, canons, or the
inherent power of the courts to discipline the members of the bar. See Note Legal Ethics-
Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 182, 1.83 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Ambulance
Chasing]; Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REV. 677, 690 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Ethics]. The purposes of these proceedings are to safeguard the
public, maintain the integrity of the legal profession, and protect the administration of justice
from reproach. In re Smith, 63 Ill. 2d 250, 256, 347 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1976); In re DiBella, 58
I11. 2d 5, 8, 316 N.E.2d 771, 772 (1974). Punishment of attorneys is not the objective; rather,
the concern is to protect the reputation and standards of the bar so that public confidence may
be warranted. See In re Sullivan, 33 I11. 2d 548, 556, 213 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1965); In re
Krasner, 32 I11. 2d 121, 130, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965); In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 386, 140
N.E.2d 825, 839 (1956); In re Melnick, 383 I11. 200, 206, 48 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1943). The
disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, but it does determine whether an attorney
is unfit to remain as a member of the bar. See In re Damisch, 38 Ill. 2d 195, 206, 230 N.E.2d
254, 260 (1967); In re Cohn, 10 I11. 2d 186, 190, 139 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1956).
23. Historically, solicitation of clients has been regarded as improper. The rules against
solicitation developed as a result of the common law prohibitions on barratry, champerty,
and maintenance. Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J. 554 (1958);
Legal Ethics, supra note 22, at 677. Barratry is repetitious generation of lawsuits, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 190 (4th ed. 1968), and champerty is the agreement to bring a suit in ex-
change for a share in the recovery, id. at 292. Maintenance refers to the financial support of a
party to a lawsuit by one without a direct interest in the suit. Id. at 1106. See V. COUNTRYMAN,
THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 156 (1966). Although the evils are known and have been
recognized more recently, courts have been reluctant to clearly define what constitutes solicita-
tion. See In re Cohn, 10 I11. 2d 186, 190, 139 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1956); In re Mitgang, 385 Ill.
311, 331, 52 N.E.2d 807, 816 (1944). Consequently, there is no standard definition of solicita-
tion. See In re Moore, 8 Ill. 2d 373, 379, 134 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1956); In re Mitgang, 385 I11. at
331, 52 N.E.2d at 816.
24. The ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (rev. 1977) was adopted by the
Illinois State Bar Association to express the standards of conduct the Association expects attor-
neys to maintain. The Code's disciplinary rules detail the minimum level of conduct which is
acceptable on the part of an attorney before disciplinary action will be invoked. DR 2-103
(prohibiting solicitation) and DR 2-104 (prohibiting employment resulting from unsolicited ad-
vice) are applicable to the Teichner case.
Where codes are adopted by statutes or incorporated into the state court rules, they are
given the full force and effect of law. Otherwise the codes adopted by bar associations do not
have statutory force and are not legally binding. Whether or not they are adopted by a state
legislature, however, the codes serve as a guide for professional conduct and disciplinary mea-
sures may be imposed if they are violated. See In re Hallet, 58 Il1. 2d 239, 250, 319 N.E.2d 48,
54 (1974); In re Krasner, 32 Ill. 2d 121, 129, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965); In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d
357, 387, 140 N.E.2d 825, 839 (1956); In re Mitgang, 385 11. 311, 324, 52 N.E.2d 807, 813
(1944); DRINKER, supra note 19, at 27.
The basis for the Illinois Code's prohibition against solicitation is that law is considered to be
a profession rather than a business, and solicitation is thought to be beneath the dignity of the
profession. Solicitation, supra note 13, at 104. Further reasons advanced for prohibiting solicita-
tion that is not warranted by personal relations include discouraging the growth of commer-
cialism, preventing the decline of professional public opinion, restraining false and misleading
claims and abuses, and limiting attorney competition. DRINKER, supra note 19, at 25; M.
FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 114 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
FREEDMAN].
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Teichner's conduct fell below the ethical standards of the legal profession
and recommended suspension from the practice of law for five years. 25 The
Review Board adopted the findings of the Hearing Board with a recommen-
dation of suspension for three instead of five years. 26 The Illinois Supreme
Court disagreed with the Review Board in relation to Teichner's conduct in
Laurel, Mississippi and found his conduct permissible.2 7 Teichner's solicita-
tion in Decatur, however, was found impermissible and provided the basis
for the imposition of a two-year suspension from practice. 28
THE TEICHNER COURT'S REASONING
The Teichner opinion focused on the permissible scope of the state's
power to prohibit certain forms of communication between attorneys and
their potential clients. The court first cited to United States Supreme Court
decisions which have recognized the right to associate for the purpose of
advancing particular beliefs29 or economic interests.30 Additionally, the
court noted United States Supreme Court decisions which have limited the
states' power to regulate advertising by attorneys, 31 and which have distin-
25. In re Teichner, No. 74-DH-18 (Hearing Bd. of Attorney Disciplinary Sys. Oct. 15, 1976),
at 14.
26. In re Teichner, No. 74-DH-18 (Review Bd. of Attorney Disciplinary Sys. June 24, 1977),
at 1.
27. 75 I11. 2d at 107, 387 N.E.2d at 272. Although the Review Board's reports are not
binding, they are granted virtually the same weight as the findings of any initial trier of fact. In
re Smith, 63 11. 2d 250, 255, 347 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1976); In re Bossov, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 441, 328
N.E.2d 309, 310 (1975); In re Hallett, 58 Ill. 2d 239, 250, 319 N.E.2d 48, 54 (1974). Contra In
re Sherman, 60 Il. 2d 590, 593, 328 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1975) (the ultimate responsibility for
determining and imposing discipline belongs to the Illinois Supreme Court).
28. 75 Ill. 2d at 116, 387 N.E.2d at 277.
29. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the plaintiffs challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state statute which prohibited certain of the organization's activities as con-
stituting improper solicitation of legal business. The Court held that solicitation by the NAACP
is a mode of expression and association protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, and
it could not be prohibited by the state's regulatory powers over the legal profession. Id. at 428.
30. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). This case involved the
recommendation of attorneys by the Brotherhood to its members, who usually selected only
recommended attorneys. The reasoning of NAACP v. Button was incorporated into this decision
with the Court holding that the first amendment protected the associational rights of union
members. Id. at 8.
31. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In this attorney advertisement case, the Court
held that certain commercial speech is entitled to first amendment protection. The Court
reasoned that if advertising were completely suppressed, the state would be inhibiting the free
flow of commercial information and inviting the public's ignorance. Id. at 365. However, adver-
tising may be regulated to assure truthfulness. Id. at 383. Bates followed the Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), decision. In this case
commercial speech was held to be entitled to first amendment protection as the Court rejected
the idea that such speech was wholly outside of the range of protection. Id. at 761. Thus, paid
advertisements were considered to be protected speech. It was held that while a state generally
can regulate advertising, forms of commercial speech which serve the interests of society by
assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking are clearly permissible. Id. at 770. See First Nat'l
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guished advertising from in-person solicitation. 32 The court focused primar-
ily on the Primus and Ohralik decisions to illustrate the application of the
first amendment to communications between attorneys and potential
clients. 33
The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted Primus and Ohralik as holding
that an attorney with a purely commercial interest can be restricted more
severely in his expression than an attorney whose interest is purely ideologi-
cal. 4 While noting the subtlety of the distinction between pecuniary and
ideological motivation, the court stressed that the distinction still should be
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (commercial advertisement was constitutionally protected
because it furthered societal interest in the "free flow of commercial information"); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (first and fourteenth amendment protection was not
forfeited because a published advertisement was a paid one); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945) (the idea that first amendment protections are wholly inapplicable to economic activity
was rejected as unsound). The first amendment does not protect only those forms of speech and
assembly that can be characterized as political. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,
223 (1967).
32. The Bates Court clearly distinguished between advertising and in-person solicitation.
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977). If the Court had intended to afford them similar
treatment, it would have done so. In-person solicitation is not visible or open to public scrutiny,
and the absence of witnesses makes proof difficult. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 457 (1978). Further, solicitation may exert pressure and compel immediate responses. The
aims and effects of solicitation are also different, for advertising tends to be informative, while
solicitation offers only a one-sided presentation and perhaps encourages speedy, uninformed
decisions. Sfikas, The Tension Between Legal Solicitation and the First Amendment, 60 CHI. B.
REC. 14, 19 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sfikas]. Contra Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private
Litigation Under the First Amendment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 93, 108 [hereinafter cited as
Simet] (solicitation considered as equivalent to advertising). Thus, although some solicitation is
protected under the first amendment, FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 116-17, it is not categori-
cally protected speech. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1186 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Advertising].
33. 75 I11. 2d at 100-03, 387 N.E.2d at 269-70.
34. Id. at 102, 387 N.E.2d at 270. Although the United States Supreme Court frequently
has used the interchangeable terms "associational values" and "political or ideological expres-
sion," the terms are vague and undefined. The phrase "associational values" represents first-
amendment-protected freedoms. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of liber-
ties protected by the first amendment); Sfikas, supra note 32, at 20 (expressive and associational
conduct have been considered to be activity at the core of the first amendment). "Associational
values" is an abstract concept which includes acts for ideological or political reasons as well as
for the furtherance of beliefs of another. The associational values in the solicitation cases arise
when litigation is not for private disputes, but is a means of political expression. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (action was
undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the objectives of the ACLU,
rather than to derive financial gain); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971) (collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within first amendment protection). Associational values are not present in conduct which
is only self-serving. Additionally, associational values do not necessarily indicate a formal organi-
zation such as the ACLU or NAACP, but may be a collection of persons who have joined
together for a certain object. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 156 (4th ed. 1968).
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attempted. 35 Where conduct falls between that present in Primus and
Ohralik, the court noted that a determination must be made as to whether
the motive and function 36 of the alleged solicitation entitle the speech and
conduct to first amendment protection. 37
The court considered the Laurel and Decatur incidents independently. 38
Teichner's activities in Laurel were held to be tinged with the associational
values that were found in Primus to be protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments. 39 Additionally, although the court found that Teichner also
had a pecuniary interest, 40 it held that he did not lose his first amendment
protection. 41 Therefore, the determination of the extent of protection af-
forded to Teichner's actions was not based solely on his prevailing pecuniary
motive: Rather, the court determined that there was a middle ground of
protected activity where the solicitation was connected with both associa-
tional values and a financial interest 42
In discussing the Laurel count, the court reasoned that a certain group of
poor persons would have been deprived of legal representation without
Teichner's input because of hasty attempts at settlements by the railroad. 43
Moreover, the court noted that since the impoverished community needed
attorneys for legal assistance,4 4 a contingent-fee contract was their only
35. 75 Ill. 2d at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 270. This determination was based on the dissent in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 787-88
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36, The motive and function factors contribute to the determination of whether the attor-
ney's speech and conduct are entitled to the protection afforded ideological or political expres-
sion. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Edelson, 313 Ill. 601, 611, 145 N.E. 246, 249 (1924)
(motive was important in determining the propriety of the solicitation). The motive of the solici-
tation involves the attorney's incentives or objectives, while its function can be equated with the
results of the activity. See text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
37. 75 I11. 2d at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
38. As a result of this approach, the court's reasoning in Teichner is often difficult to follow.
39 . 75 I11. 2d at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271. This holding was necessary because the applica-
tion of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning required the Illinois court to find associa-
tional values before affording protection to Teichner. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Primus
is applicable: "And we may be sure that the next lawyer in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for
similar conduct will come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of 'political association' to
assure that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of policy holders." In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 442 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is possible that a defendant in Teichner's
position could fabricate an associational relationship to cover his true pecuniary interest. But see
Sfikas, supra note 32, at 22, where the author states that this argument "overlooks the Court's
strong emphasis in both cases on the economic interest of the lawyer."
40. 75 Ill. 2d at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
41. Id. at 105, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
42. Id. at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271. Alternatively, it could be argued that the court was being
subjective in its determination of a middle ground of protection and was basing it solely on the
degree of misconduct involved. Under this analysis, the court may have considered Ohralik's
conduct to be inexcusable, Primus' to be acceptable, and Teichner's as somewhere between the
two.
43. Id. at 104, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
44. id.
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practical alternative.45 Accordingly, Teichner's conduct was protected be-
cause it served to further the interests of the community4 6 and there was no
clear and convincing evidence of overreaching or other improper conduct 47
which would justify the imposition of sanctions based on this conduct alone.
In considering the Decatur counts, the court adhered to the findings of
the Hearing and Review Boards. 48 Based on Teichner's attempts to obtain
the names of potential clients from individuals, and on his aggressive solicita-
tion of an emotionally distraught family, 49 the court concluded that Teich-
ner's actions were not protected. Specifically, the court found Teichner's
Decatur conduct to be faulty because it did not further the associational
rights of any person or group, nor did it further the dissemination of truthful
information regarding legal services. 5
The substantial contingent fee Teichner solicited in Decatur was regarded
by the court as an aggravating factor. 51 This contingent fee was distin-
guished from those in the Laurel incidents on the basis of social policy. 52
In this instance, the fee Teichner solicited was for one-third of any settle-
ment and up to forty or fifty percent of any judgment. 53 The court indi-
cated that the high fee might not be justified by the benefits the clients
would gain from Teichner's services. Additionally, the court viewed the fi-
nancial interest in the client's recovery as tending to make the attorney less
sensitive to the client's interests. 54 Although the solicitation itself was not
45. Id.
46. Id. at 105, 387 N.E.2d at 271. Prohibiting this type of communication was considered to
be a denial of legal assistance to those otherwise unable to retain legal counsel. Id. at 107, 387
N.E.2d at 272.
47. Id.
48. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
50. 75 II1. 2d at 108, 387 N.E.2d at 273.
51. Contingent fees are a typical means of compensating attorneys in tort litigation. They
have been approved in Illinois because of the social value in permitting access to competent
counsel regardless of one's financial situation. Estate of Harnetiaux v. Hartzell, 91 111. App. 2d
222, 228, 234 N.E.2d 81, 84 (1968). However, contingent fees have the effect of giving the
attorney a pecuniary interest in the litigation. Unless they are absolutely fair, they may ad-
versely effect the attorney/client relationship. Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 I11. 2d 73, 83, 195 N.E.2d
137, 142 (1963). They are closely scrutinized by the courts for this reason, to prevent solicitation,
and to otherwise prevent denigration of the legal profession. Id.
52. 75 I11. 2d at 109, 387 N.E.2d at 273. The court stated:
Although the economic imperatives which support the contingent-fee system also
impel us to refrain from prohibiting its use by a community leader (such as Rev.
Johnson in Laurel, Mississippi) to provide legal advice to persons who otherwise
would not receive it, such considerations apply with substantially lesser force to
respondent's conduct with regard to the Garners.
id.
53. Id., 387 N.E.2d at 274.
54. Id. at 109-10, 387 N.E.2d at 274.
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viewed by the court as fraudulent or immoral, Teichner's ancillary miscon-
duct was held to demonstrate a gross deviation from the minimum standards
of conduct expected of attorneys. 55
CRITICISM OF THE TEICHNER COURT'S REASONING
The Teichner court held that the solicitation involved in the Laurel inci-
dents was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, while the sol-
icitation involved in the Decatur incidents was not. The major problem with
the court's reasoning lies in its simplistic syllogism: it found the Laurel inci-
dents analogous to those in Primus and the Decatur incidents analogous to
those in Ohralik. By misapplying the principles of these two cases, the Il-
linois court confounded the distinctions outlined by the United States Su-
preme Court. 56 Essentially, the court extended Primus far beyond its in-
tended meaning.
Misapplication of the Ohralik and Primus Decisions
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,57 an attorney used hospital vis-
its, photographs, and tape recordings to pressure two teenage girls into
employing him. 58 The clients subsequently repudiated the contracts that
had been elicited. The United States Supreme Court determined that
Ohralik had been soliciting clients, in-person, for pecuniary gain and that it
was constitutional to discipline him for this conduct. 59 The Court based its
reasoning on the fact that such in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain was
likely, under the circumstances, to pose dangers that a state has the right to
55. Id. at 115, 387 N.E.2d at 276. The court cited Teichner's activities as contrary to "the
goal of making information about legal services available, because it dissuades individuals from
seeking legal counsel." Id. at 116, 387 N.E.2d at 277.
56. Primus and Ohralik are decisions important to the development of the law in the solici-
tation area. See Simet, supra note 32, at 93, where it is maintained that "both cases not only
involve significant First Amendment free speech questions but also have important impacts on
the practice of law and the public availability of legal services ...." But see Young, Supreme
Court Report, 64 A.B.A.J. 1151 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Young], where the author questions
whether any guidelines were established as a result of these two decisions and notes that the
only conclusive element arising from the cases is that "some kinds of personal solicitation of
clients by a lawyer are protected by the First Amendment. The limits remain to be defined."
Id.
57. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
58. See note 4 supra.
59. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978). See Young, supra note 56, at
1152 (Primus and Ohralik discussed as recent decisions).
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prevent. 60 It found, therefore, that such purely commercial speech was not
protected by the Constitution. 61
Unlike the Ohralik situation, In re Primus 62 involved an attorney from
the not-for-profit American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Following an
ACLU meeting concerning sterilization, attorney Primus wrote to an indi-
vidual who had expressed interest in a possible lawsuit and informed her of
the ACLU's offer of free representation. 63 The Supreme Court held that
the letter was purely ideological expression, was non-pecuniary in its motiva-
tion, and was therefore constitutionally protected. 64
The distinctions between the facts and holdings of Primus and Ohralik
indicate that the first and fourteenth amendments afford varying degrees of
protection to the attorney engaged in client solicitation. Primus protected
associational solicitation with no pecuniary interest or commercial motive. 65
On the other hand, the Court has consistently prohibited solicitation that
involves contingent-fee contracts. 11 The solicitation in Primus involved a
60. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978). Stirring up litigation,
asserting fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession and harming the solicited client by
overreaching, overcharging, and misrepresenting are dangers which a state has a right to pre-
vent. Id. at 461. This right of the state is based on its responsibility for maintaining standards in
licensed professions. Id. Although these state interests exist, solicitation, despite its reprehensi-
ble qualities, does not involve "venality, fraudulent practices or moral turpitude." In re
Krasner, 32 I11. 2d 121, 129, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965); In re Cohn, 10 I11. 2d 186, 190, 139
N.E.2d 301, 303 (1956); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 I11. 578, 591, 173 N.E. 827, 832
(1930). See also In re Moore, 8 I11. 2d 373, 379, 134 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1956) (solicitation is more
likely to bring the profession into disrepute); In re Veach, 1 Ill. 2d 264, 272, 115 N.E.2d 257,
261 (1953) (solicitation rarely involves fraud or deceit, but that does not make it any less rep-
rehensible, nor does it promote the good reputation of the bar). For a discussion of state in-
terests, see note 91 infra.
61. 436 U.S. at 449. First amendment rights can be restricted where there exists a compel-
ling state interest. However, as one author has noted, a "[p]recise definition of 'compelling' is
• . . elusive. But past judicial usage implies at a minimum that courts will subject . . . solicita-
tion restrictions to very close scrutiny and insist that there be no less drastic means available by
which the state can achieve its objectives." Advertising, supra note 32, at 1187. Accordingly, a
state must draw regulations narrowly to avoid unnecessary abridgment, First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978), and any attempt to restrict first amendment liberties must be
justified. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
62. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
63. See note 3 supra.
64. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978). In so holding, the Court noted that the state's
interest in preventing unnecessary litigation and in preserving the integrity of the profession did
not justify the restrictions. Id. at 436. Although a state has the power to regulate to avoid evils
before the harm occurs, it must do so with great precision. Id. at 438.
65. This solicitation falls within the core of first amendment protection because it is expres-
sive and associational conduct. Sfikas, supra note 32, at 20.
66. Although the ACLU had a policy of requesting counsel fees, the Supreme Court held
that this did not deprive Primus of Button's protection. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 429 (1978).
The Primus Court indicated that there is an important distinction between court-awarded attor-
neys' fees and contingent fees: "Counsel fees are awarded in the discretion of the court; awards
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written letter, while in Ohralik in-person solicitation was at issue. The Court
viewed the letter in Primus as falling under the first amendment's protection
of associational values, for its purpose was to express the beliefs and advance
the objectives of the ACLU, 67 and it was not written for financial gain. Such
solicitation was purely informative 68 and noncoercive, and it triggered only
remote possibilities of harm. 69 In contrast, the Ohralik court viewed the
in-person solicitation as harboring a significant potential for harm. 7 Read-
ing Ohralik and Primus together, it appears that the constitution protects
solicitation accompanied by the traditional expressive values associated with
the first amendment, and leaves unshielded that solicitation which involves
pecuniary values absent the associational component. 71
According to the Teichner court, in determining where conduct fits for
first amendment purposes, the motive and the function 72 of the activity de-
serve consideration. 73 This analysis considers equally the intent and motive
of the speaker, as well as the function and purpose of the activity. Motive,
however, seems to have been the more important factor in the Ohralik and
are not drawn from the plaintiffs recovery, and are usually premised on a successful outcome;
the amounts awarded often may not correspond to fees generally obtainable in private litiga-
tion." Id. at 430. The Court further distinguished the fees by determining that there is "no
basis for equating the work of lawyers associated with the ACLU or the NAACP with that of a
group that exists for the primary purpose of financial gain through the recovery of counsel fees."
Id. at 431. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
67. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). The letter was protected because "[t]he ACLU
engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a
means of communicating useful information to the public." Id. at 431.
68. In Ohralik, 436 U.S. 477 (1978), the argument that the commercial speech at issue was
analogous to the informative advertising in Bates failed because in-person solicitation has been
distinguished from advertising. See note 32 supra; Sfikas, supra note 32, at 19.
69. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 436 (1978).
70. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978). For a discussion of these
types of harm, see note 60 supra.
71. Although this appears to be a clear analysis, its application elsewhere has yet to be
determined. There are not many cases to date which have relied on Primus and Ohralik, so
there is no real pattern of development. See, e.g., Jaques v. State Bar Grievance Adm'r, 436
U.S. 952 (1978) (judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court was vacated and the case was re-
manded for further consideration in light of Ohralik); John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F.
Supp. 1272 (S.D. Me. 1978) (although commercial speech is entitled to some constitutional
protection, it does not have the preferred position of noncommercial speech as elucidated in
Ohralik); Olitsky v. O'Malley, 453 F. Supp. 1052 (D. Mass. 1978) (the restriction of plaintiff's
first amendment freedoms was found to be no greater than necessary). In Sfikas, supra note 32,
at 22, the author stated his interpretation of the basis for determining permissible solicitation:
If the soliciting lawyer stands to gain economically from the solicitation, the disci-
plinary rules will be enforced. On the other hand, if the solicitation is such that it
falls within the "political" arena and the solicitor is not likely to gain from the
solicitation, then it would appear highly likely that any attempt to apply the
disciplinary rules would be held unconstitutional.
This analysis follows the Primus and Ohralik distinctions.
72. See note 35 supra.
73. 75 I11. 2d at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
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Primus decisions. 74 Therefore, it is arguable that the Supreme Court in-
tended that greater emphasis should be placed on motive than on func-
tion. 75 This consideration is important, for in Teichner the attorney's mo-
tive involved the evils which the state has an interest in preventing. 76
The finding that Teichner's self-serving conduct in the Laurel incident was
protected conflicts with the Ohralik and Primus holdings. In Primus, the
speaker's motive and the function of the activity were based on assistance to
the potential client, the true beneficiary.77 Primus' ideological motive was
crucial because it formed the basis of the associational element through
which first amendment protection was provided. In Ohralik, however, the
prevailing motive was pecuniary and the attorney was the beneficiary. 7" In
applying the motive/function test, the Illinois Supreme Court found that
Teichner's motive was also pecuniary and the function of his Laurel in-
volvement was to benefit him financially. This situation is analagous to that
in Ohralik, and since the defendant in Ohralik was not protected on this
basis, neither should Teichner have been protected. Furthermore, in its
consideration of the Laurel incident, 79 the Teichner court inappropriately
reasoned that although Teichner's motive was pecuniary, to prohibit this
type of communication would be to deny legal assistance to those in an un-
fortunate position. The court's analysis regarding this aspect of the decision
was not extensive, even though the existence of a financial interest without
an ideological basis warranted such treatment. Additionally, the court's
reasoning was not necessarily valid in that Teichner was not indispensible in
this situation. Other attorneys attended the informational meeting, and it is
conceivable that one would have taken these personal injury suits on a
contingent-fee basis.8 0 The fact that individuals already had been informed
of their rights further decreases Teichner's role in preventing their depriva-
74. This can be determined by comparing Ohralik, where in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain was not protected, with Primus, where the Court protected ideological solicita-
tion. See text accompanying notes 77-78 infra. This is supported further by the basic principle
that commercial interests may be subject to greater regulation than noncommercial. Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
75. The motive involved has been emphasized in determining the propriety of activity. See
In re Heirich, 10 111. 2d 357, 387, 140 N.E.2d 825, 840 (1956); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Edelson,
313 Ill. 601, 611, 145 N.E. 246, 249 (1924). Thus, initiating litigation in order to obtain fees is
unprofessional and dishonorable, but if it is done to secure the client's claims it is permissible.
See Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Edelson, 313 I11. at 611, 145 N.E. at 249. Although the United States
Supreme Court's emphasis seems to have been on motive, it is clear that the determination of
protected speech cannot be based solely on the motive involved.
76. See note 60 supra and note 91 infra.
77. See note 3 supra.
78. See note 4 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 9-13 supra.
80. This is further evidenced by the fact that in actuality Teichner did minimal work in
relation to these claims and distributed them to a New Orleans law firm instead. In re Teich-
ner, No. 74-DH-18 (Hearing Bd. of Attorney Disciplinary Sys. Oct. 15, 1976), at 13.
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tion of legal assistance.81 The community's need for information regarding
the availability of legal services did not translate into a need for solicitation.
Moreover, the interests of the "Reverend's community," which allegedly
had been furthered by Teichner's involvement in the Laurel incident, 82 are
distinguishable from the associational values protected in Primus. Although a
formal association or organization is not required to obtain first amendment
protection of speech, clearly the Primus Court did not imply that associa-
tional values could be claimed in all circumstances. 83 In Primus, first
amendment protection was extended to Primus' solicitation on behalf of the
not-for-profit ACLU. Teichner, however, is distinguishable. The attorney
was representing himself, not a community or association. The court's view
was that Teichner's activities were for the benefit of the "Reverend's com-
munity." There was, however, no "community," 84 only injured people, and
Reverend Johnson was a community leader only in the sense that he estab-
lished a program of relief in Laurel. Teichner and the other attorneys were
contacted by the Reverend in his attempt to help, but Teichner's activities
were directed toward individuals on his own behalf- no association existed
with the church. 85
The court's reasoning relies on this "nebulous associational relationship" 8 6
formulated to follow the requirements of Primus. Except for this rela-
tionship, Teichner's actions are analogous to Ohralik's.8 7  Thus, as the
"community" associational relationship concept fails, so does the court's basis
for analogizing Teichner to Primus.
On the basis of Ohralik, solicitation without associational values can be
regulated upon a showing of compelling state interests. 88 For restriction of
solicitation with associational values, however, narrow and specific regula-
tions are required. 89 Teichner's commercial speech may have been pro-
81. In the Decatur incidents, there was no such alternative source of information. While the
substantial fee was justified in the Laurel incidents, in Decatur it was considered an aggravating
factor in addition to the solicitation. 75 I11. 2d at 110, 387 N.E.2d at 274. This fact underscores
an inconsistency in the court's reasoning as there vas a need for information in Decatur.
82. Id. at 105, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
83. Justice Rehnquist discussed this possibility in Primus. See note 39 supra.
84. Even if there were such an entity, it still would not provide Teichner's activities with first
amendment protection. The reverend's invitation to come to Laurel was to discuss the situation,
not to solicit employment. Teichner was not soliciting on behalf of the "community" as he
neither represented nor was employed by it. This solicitation can be distinguished from the
protected activity in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), and in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963). In both of these cases, the attorney was representing the association and the solicitation
was done on its behalf.
85. 75 I11. 2d at 117, 387 N.E.2d at 277 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
86. id.
87. Justice Ryan's concurrence argued for this analysis by stating that "[t]here is no organi-
zation in existence with which the respondent was associated. Rev. Johnson stood as a self-
appointed person in the community conducting what he thought was a helpful effort." Id.
88. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978).
89. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978).
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tected by the first amendment 9 0 had there been no compelling state interest
to justify its regulation. 91 However, overreaching 92 -a type of conduct the
state has an interest in preventing-was present in Teichner's actions. In
this respect Teichner and Ohralik are distinguishable from Primus, where
the evils the state sought to prevent were not present. 93 In Ohralik, a
compelling state interest existed to prohibit in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain, as it did in Teichner.
Since the court determined that the solicitation in Laurel involved associa-
tional values, a discussion should have followed addressing the applica-
ble no-solicitation rules. The court should have examined the conformity of
the rules 'to the "narrowly tailored" requirement of Prinius. 94 However,
since the court held that Teichner's solicitation was protected, this determi-
nation implies that the regulations were not narrow enough to constitution-
ally prohibit such conduct. Yet, the court did not consider this aspect of the
case.
90. The first amendment overbreadth doctrine, a special exception to the rule which pro-
hibits challenges to statutes because they might be applied unconstitutionally in circumstances
other than those presently involved, does not apply. The reason for this departure from the rule
is that overbroad statutes might "chill protected speech" because "First Amendment interests
are fragile interests, and a person who contemplates protected activity might be discouraged by
the in terrorem effect of the statute." Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. at 380. The rationale is that
the "possible harm to society from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that protected speech will be muted." Id. It is not likely that Teichner's
speech is subject to overbroad regulation. The Court has distinguished the application of the
doctrine because of the "common-sense differences" between commercial speech and other va-
rieties. The advertising involved in Bates was linked with commercial well-being where such
speech was not considered "susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation." Id. at 381.
91. The state interests in regulating such speech include fostering favorable public attitudes
toward the legal profession and preventing overreaching, undue influences, intimidation, and
other forms of "vexatious conduct." It is not the solicitation itself that makes the conduct vexa-
tious, but the motive and manner. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 470 (1978)
(Marshall, J., concurring). There is nothing inherently immoral in the solicitation of business.
Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 266, 98 S.W. 178, 179 (1906). Businesses
normally solicit, but attorneys are distinguished because they are members of a licensed profes-
sion which requires good moral character. See DRINKER, supra note 19, at 211. Unprofessional
conduct is considered to be against the public good. See In re Mitgang, 385 I11. 311, 333, 52
N.E.2d 807, 817 (1944). Generally, it is unethical for an attorney to solicit and "[n]o member
who cherishes the high ideals of the profession will be guilty of such unethical practices." State
v. Rubin, 201 Wis. 30, 32, 229 N.W. 36, 37 (1930). The evils of solicitation are not thought to
arise from an occasional infraction lsut from repeated and active solicitation. Id. See In re Veach,
1 111. 2d 264, 272, 115 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1953). Because the facts of the misconduct in each
solicitation case vary, identical treatment is not required. In re Damisch, 38 I11. 2d 195, 205,
230 N.E.2d 254 260 (1967).
92. Overreaching results from the aggressive competition for clients which "leads to lawyers
approaching clients at times when the clients are in no condition to properly consider retention
of a lawyer, for example, immediately after an accident." Advertising, supra note 32, at 1184
n.23. See Sfikas, supra note 32, at 19; Simet, supra note 32, at 93; Ambulance Chasing, supra
note 22, at 182.
93. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978). Thus, the narrowly tailored or designed regula-
tions were not necessary.
94. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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Analytical Shortcomings
Teichner's conduct in Laurel was found permissible because there was no
clear and convincing evidence of overreaching or other improper con-
duct. 95 This should not have been the decisive factor. Circumstantial evi-
dence is considered legal evidence. 96 Therefore, to provide clear and con-
vincing proof, the improper conduct does not have to be demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the impropriety of Teichner's
conduct could have been substantiated by the contingent-fee contracts he
obtained and by his agressive solicitation.
The separate discussion of the Laurel and Decatur incidents makes the
Teichner opinion difficult to follow. Rather than a continual analysis
throughout the decision, the emphasis in the court's reasoning is on the
Laurel incident, and the remainder of the opinion focuses on the fact situa-
tions. 97 Although the discussion of the incidents was separated, it does not
automatically follow that they are distinct. This separation poses the question
of whether the Decatur conduct is truly distinguishable from the Laurel
conduct for the purpose of analysis.
In the Decatur incident, Teichner's conduct was distinguished correctly
from the conduct in Primus and incorrectly from that in the Laurel incident.
There were no associational rights involved in the Decatur incidents and
Teichner's conduct could not be justified by claiming a first amendment
right to disseminate information. 98  Furthermore, the justification 99 for the
use of the contingent fee in the Laurel incidents was faulty. The court artifi-
cially distinguished the Laurel incidents from the Decatur incidents. The
substantial contingent fee involved in both situations should have been con-
sidered as an aggravating factor as Teichner, not the Reverend or the com-
munity, was the beneficiary of the contingent fee. Since the behavior in
Laurel was virtually identical to that in Decatur, it should have been treated
similarly.
Additionally, the Teichner court went beyond the reasoning of Primus in
an attempt to fit within, and to further clarify, the substantially undefined
middle ground of first amendment protection. 100 The court did not articu-
late a clear distinction between pecuniary interests and associational in-
terests; rather it apparently recognized a hazy area of protection for attor-
neys who stand to realize some pecuniary gain by their relationship with a
community group or association. Indeed, the effect of the court's decision in
Teichner is to dilute the impact of both Primus and Ohralik.
95. 75 I11. 2d at 107, 387 N.E.2d at 272.
96. In re Krasner, 32 I11. 2d 121, 127, 204 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1965).
97. The court's reason for declining analysis of the Decatur incidents is unclear. Perhaps the
Laurel and Decatur incidents were too similar for the court to distinguish effectively.
98. In-person solicitation has been distinguished from informative activities. See note 32
supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
100. 75 I11. 2d at 117, 387 N.E.2d at 277 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
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The need for a middle ground between these two cases was assessed accu-
rately by the court, 101 but the facts presented should not have been misused
in order to establish it. Teichner's conduct did not fall into that middle
ground, because a predominantly pecuniary concern was involved. 102 Thus,
the decision would have been more properly decided solely on the basis of
Ohralik.
Finally, it is perplexing that the Teichner court decided the case in this
manner, instead of using the guidelines established by Primus and Ohralik.
One viable explanation is that the court felt that the five-year suspension
recommended by the Hearing Board was too harsh. 103 Thus, the court may
have created artificial distinctions in an effort to mitigate the effect of Teich-
ner's conduct. By analogizing the case to Ohralik and Primus and thereby
establishing a middle ground of protection, the court was able to effect and
justify the reduced sanction. The validity and desirability of this approach is
questionable.
SUGGESTIONS
Refinement of the court's standard in determining protected solicitation is
imperative. 104 Since associational values and pecuniary interests are the
major distinctions between Primus and Ohralik, one possible solution is to
apply association as the sole determinative factor. An association that oper-
ated on a contingent fee basis, however, would present problems. Neverthe-
less, this is more acceptable than the Teichner result. It seems logical that
even with a financial interest there would be less opportunity for abuse by
an association, which by definition involves more than one person, than by
an individual. 10 5
An additional alternative is offered in Justice Ryan's concurring opinion in
Teichner. 106 Since solicitation triggers first amendment concerns, further
deviations from the existing limitations should be defined by the United
States Supreme Court. This would provide the needed clarification of the
protection standards. If this clarification does not occur, uncertainties caused
by the various jurisdictions' inconsistent interpretations will go unresolved.
Indeed, as other jurisdictions establish a middle ground of protection in so-
licitation cases, Teichner should not be given significant consideration. In
101. id. at 103, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
102. Id.
103. The Hearing Board recommended that Teichner be suspended from practicing law for
five years. This was reduced by the Review Board which recommended a three-year suspen-
sion. (In re Teichner, No. 74-DH-18 (Hearing Bd. of Attorney Disciplinary Sys. Oct. 15, 1976),
modified, No. 74-DH-18. Review Board of Attorney Disciplinary Sys. June 24, 1977.)
104. This need will become more evident in future cases in which there is an authentic
middle ground of political or associational values coupled with a financial interest.
105. Even if the motive were pecuniary, it would be more difficult to persuade all of the
members of an association to act improperly than it would be to persuade an individual.
106. 75 Ill. 2d at 116, 387 N.E.2d at 277 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
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order to prevent the perpetuation of this dilemma, it is urged that further
action be taken by the judiciary and by the legislature, 107 first to reaffirm
the need for solicitation rules, and then to align Illinois law with the Primus
and Ohralik guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has yet to clarify the standard for con-
duct falling between that involved in the Primus and Ohralik cases. In re
Teichner, one of the first cases to interpret Primus and Ohralik, the Illinois
Supreme Court established such a middle ground of protection for attorney
solicitation cases. This decision will allow virtually any case to fit within the
middle ground of protection. Its application will require merely an allegation
that the solicitation was intended to assure that no one would be deprived of
legal information. The reasoning in the case is not sound. It is likely that
subsequent cases will seek to clarify this decision, as Teichner has made it
more difficult to identify, and therefore to control, solicitation. Following
Teichner, Illinois law in this area may be inconsistent with that of jurisdic-
tions which may interpret the Ohralik and Primus distinctions more nar-
rowly. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision deviated from the guidelines
established by the United States Supreme Court, and now a refinement of
solicitation rules by the courts, legislatures, and bar associations is necessary
to prevent attorney solicitation rules from becoming meaningless.
Lisa A. Schwartz
107. In order to clarify the role of solicitation, the courts, legislatures and bar associations
will have to reevaluate their perception of solicitation. A determination must be made as to
whether the rules against solicitation should be maintained and therefore enforced or, alterna-
tively, eliminated.
Some forms of solicitation are permissible. Friends can refer clients without compensation
and can encourage others to hire a specific attorney. See Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky.
77, 98, 186 S.W. 919, 926 (1916); Solicitation, supra note 13, at 107. Rules prohibiting solicita-
tion are not necessarily inherently good. There are problems with the existing rules, other than
their lack of specificity. They are often marred with inconsistencies. Memberships at country
clubs and dinners with potential clients are methods used to gain clients. These are permitted
forms of solicitation and the "business expenses" deduction indicates governmental approval of
such solicitation. See In re Cohn, 10 I11. 2d 186, 196, 139 N.E.2d 301, 306 (1956) (Bristow, J.,
specially concurring); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers,
25 U. Cm. L. REv. 674 (1957-58). It is argued that the rules tend to concentrate the business
in the hands of a few and have the effect of preventing new attorneys from getting established.
Id. at 681-82. However, the trend is to clearly define permissibility standards, not to abandon
the solicitation rules. This is true in Illinois where there has been a traditionally lenient attitude
towards solicitation. See Comment, Ambulance Chasing in Illinois: A Success Story, 1957 U.
ILL. L.F. 309.
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